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    <title>topic Re: syslog: NIS attack in Operating System - HP-UX</title>
    <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230867#M328611</link>
    <description>Hi:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Your environment is a disaster waiting to happen.  Multiple uid=0 accounts mean that the first time you do something like:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;# find / -user markdsu -exec rm -rf {} +&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;...to clean off "makdsu" because that developer has left your shop...you remove all files and directories owned by 'root' (uid=0).&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;If your argument is accountability, I submit that you said it was a developer's system; and I submit that *one* uid=0 (viz. the real 'root' account) is sufficient given the fact that your '/var/adm/sulog' tracks the transitions from any user account to 'root'.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Regards!&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;...JRF...</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 21:46:09 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>James R. Ferguson</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2008-07-09T21:46:09Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>syslog: NIS attack</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230866#M328610</link>
      <description>We use a scheme for granting developers and testers root perms on systems via an "su" account, which is basically an /etc/passwd entry similar to their normal account, but with a UID of 0.  Conventions aside, that's the way they've been doing it and they're happy with, so that's what I've been asked to do.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;ie:&lt;BR /&gt;norsu:ZZZZZZZZZZ.,n.xS:0:3::/root/users/norsu:/sbin/sh&lt;BR /&gt;markdsu:ZZZZZZZZZZ:0:3::/root/users/markdsu:/sbin/sh&lt;BR /&gt;thomfsu:ZZZZZZZZZZ:0:3:Thom Fitzpatrick SU,1-916-XXX-XXXX,Roseville,thom.fitzpatrick@hp.com,thomf:/root/users/thomfsu:/bin/ksh&lt;BR /&gt;dhyniesu:ZZZZZZZZZZ:0:3:Daniel Hynie SU,1-916-XXX-XXXX,Roseville,daniel.hynie@hp.com,dhynie:/root/users/dhyniesu:/bin/ksh&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;On a couple of newer 11.23 boxes, I'm getting some push-back - from the OS!  &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;# su - thomfsu&lt;BR /&gt;su: unknown login thomfsu&lt;BR /&gt;Jul  9 14:29:32 amkibld06 syslog: NIS attack, user thomfsu has uid 0&lt;BR /&gt;amkibld06:/root/users/root # &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;I did some googling, and it appears that this is a change in the behavior of rlogind.  My question is this: is there a way to get around this new restriction, or has my paradigm been sprained?&lt;BR /&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 20:39:30 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230866#M328610</guid>
      <dc:creator>thom_14</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-07-09T20:39:30Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: syslog: NIS attack</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230867#M328611</link>
      <description>Hi:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Your environment is a disaster waiting to happen.  Multiple uid=0 accounts mean that the first time you do something like:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;# find / -user markdsu -exec rm -rf {} +&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;...to clean off "makdsu" because that developer has left your shop...you remove all files and directories owned by 'root' (uid=0).&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;If your argument is accountability, I submit that you said it was a developer's system; and I submit that *one* uid=0 (viz. the real 'root' account) is sufficient given the fact that your '/var/adm/sulog' tracks the transitions from any user account to 'root'.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Regards!&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;...JRF...</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 21:46:09 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230867#M328611</guid>
      <dc:creator>James R. Ferguson</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-07-09T21:46:09Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: syslog: NIS attack</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230868#M328612</link>
      <description>If you really need those users to have access to root commands you need sudo.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Mark Syder (like the drink but spelt different)</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 06:50:44 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230868#M328612</guid>
      <dc:creator>MarkSyder</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-07-10T06:50:44Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: syslog: NIS attack</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230869#M328613</link>
      <description>I understand the various problems with this scheme, but I inherited it almost 10 years ago.  I *tried* at one point to implement sudo, but it went over like a lead balloon (MythBusters notwithstanding).  We have this arrangement where they tell me what they want done and pay me to do it; unfortunately it doesn't work the other way around...</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 14:19:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230869#M328613</guid>
      <dc:creator>thom_14</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-07-10T14:19:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: syslog: NIS attack</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230870#M328614</link>
      <description>Hi,&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;I think this is a good time, to tell your developers, that the current (unsafe) method of the xxxsu - accounts is no longer possible under the new OS.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;mfG Peter</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 14:00:51 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230870#M328614</guid>
      <dc:creator>Peter Nikitka</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-07-11T14:00:51Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: syslog: NIS attack</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230871#M328615</link>
      <description>I found a temporary workaround.  It seems that only rlogind exhibits this behavior at this point, so if you rlogin to the box (yes, that's  a whole 'nother box of worms) then you can't su to the XXXsu UID 0 user.   However, you can still telnet or ssh directly to the box as the XXXsu user, it works fine.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Apart from all this, it seems silly that rlogind reports this as an NIS issue.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 16:01:04 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/syslog-nis-attack/m-p/4230871#M328615</guid>
      <dc:creator>thom_14</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2008-07-11T16:01:04Z</dc:date>
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