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    <title>topic Re: IDS/9000 Overhead in Operating System - HP-UX</title>
    <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/ids-9000-overhead/m-p/2689326#M756875</link>
    <description>idssysdsp is a setuid-root program which runs with euid of ids (non-privileged user) most of the time and calls setresuid() to set its effective uid to root only when it needs the privilege to open a root owned log file.  This privilege bracketing is a common security practice, and running idssysdsp with real uid of root would defeat the purpose.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The idsagent main process which execs the idsssysdsp program makes sure the file is owned by ids:ids and will refuse to fork and exec it&lt;BR /&gt;if it is not owned by ids:ids.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;This is core to the IDS design of running with as few privileges as possible. &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;I do not have access to the CA Access Control documentation.  Do they allow you to filter out events such as setresuid?&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Pierre&lt;BR /&gt;IDS/9000&lt;BR /&gt;HP</description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2002 19:41:44 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Pierre Pasturel</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2002-03-22T19:41:44Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>IDS/9000 Overhead</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/ids-9000-overhead/m-p/2689325#M756874</link>
      <description>Hi, &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;I succeeded to install IDS/9000 v2 on our &lt;BR /&gt;server &amp;amp; run it. But now I have performance &lt;BR /&gt;problem. &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Process "idssysdsp" that tracks log files does "su root" all the time. We have "CA Access &lt;BR /&gt;Control" installed on server. "Access Control" &lt;BR /&gt;catches every "su" &amp;amp; proceede it thru its own &lt;BR /&gt;checks. As a result, CPU usage jumps to the &lt;BR /&gt;sky. &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Do you know any way to run "idssysdsp" as root and not "ids" to prevent su execution ? &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Thanks a lot, &lt;BR /&gt;Alex &lt;BR /&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2002 16:31:31 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/ids-9000-overhead/m-p/2689325#M756874</guid>
      <dc:creator>Alex Gayainsky</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2002-03-22T16:31:31Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: IDS/9000 Overhead</title>
      <link>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/ids-9000-overhead/m-p/2689326#M756875</link>
      <description>idssysdsp is a setuid-root program which runs with euid of ids (non-privileged user) most of the time and calls setresuid() to set its effective uid to root only when it needs the privilege to open a root owned log file.  This privilege bracketing is a common security practice, and running idssysdsp with real uid of root would defeat the purpose.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The idsagent main process which execs the idsssysdsp program makes sure the file is owned by ids:ids and will refuse to fork and exec it&lt;BR /&gt;if it is not owned by ids:ids.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;This is core to the IDS design of running with as few privileges as possible. &lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;I do not have access to the CA Access Control documentation.  Do they allow you to filter out events such as setresuid?&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Pierre&lt;BR /&gt;IDS/9000&lt;BR /&gt;HP</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2002 19:41:44 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.hpe.com/t5/operating-system-hp-ux/ids-9000-overhead/m-p/2689326#M756875</guid>
      <dc:creator>Pierre Pasturel</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2002-03-22T19:41:44Z</dc:date>
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