MUP VMS831H1I_SYS_MUP-V1100 - how critical is this?

[sgprasad]

Hi,

The text the "OpenVMS Guide to System Security" is changed in the "HP OpenVMS Guide to System Security OpenVMS Version 8.4"

http://h71000.www7.hp.com/doc/84final/ba554_90015/ba554_90015.pdf

"Passwords used in break-in attempts are not displayed on security operator terminals and also not logged to the security audit log file."

Thanks and warm regards,
Prasad

[Verne Britton]

I was concerned by this too, and logged case 4616845931 on July 8 ... (I figure we have had a support contract for 25+ years, might as well ask a question or two):

and was given this response and the case was closed (no one told me it was secret) (may wrap poorly):


We understand that customer is asking for an option to display the wrong password from the break in
records, which were disabled in the recent recent vms*_sys_mup-v* patches.
As already highlighted in the problem description, this change was done due to a security alert.
Leaving an option to display the wrong password in the operating system can be abused in general.
It is also an industry standard to not display any information related to passwords in the logs.
While the wrong password display might be useful for the current customer in some cases, going
without this display will be a safe and recommended approach.
Thanks and warm regards,
(OpenVMS Security Engineering)



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I mentioned to them I have made use of (as others have said) the literal password data in the audit logs in the past ...

I also suggested having a switchable setting ... with the default being to hide the password but allow the system manager to return to the old behavior if desired.


Verne

[Ian Miller.]

References

SSRT100144
SSRT090267
CVE-2010-1973